The study investigated the influence of campus environmental factors on job commitments. The research design was quantitative descriptive sample survey of ex-post facto type while the population includes both male and female senior non-teaching staff of Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ogun State. Multi-stage sampling technique was used in choosing 200 participants selected from nine faculties and one college. A structured and close-ended questionnaire titled ‘Campus Environmental Factors and Job Commitment Questionnaire’ with reliability co-efficient of 0.85 obtained through Cronbach alpha methods was (...) administered. 170 were retrieved from the 200 instruments administered. Data were analysed using frequency count, simple percentage, Pearson Correlation, and t test of significance. The study demonstrated a significant positive influence of campus environmental factors on job commitments of staff in the university. Useful recommendations were also raised. (shrink)

This paper uses the conceptual apparatus of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to tackle a foundational issue in the philosophical literature on group identity, namely, the problem of difference. This problem suggests that any appeal to a collective identity is oppressive because it imposes a shared identity on the members of a group and suppresses the internal differences of the group. I develop a Wittgensteinian view of identity that dissolves this problem by showing the conceptual confusions on which it rests. My Wittgensteinian (...) view of identity tries to establish two main theses: first, that identity is bound up with difference and presupposes heterogeneity; and second, that the solidarity of identity groups, far from being obstructed by differences, actually requires diversity. Drawing from gender and sexuality studies, I use the mechanism of disidentification to show how there can be shared identities and identity-based solidarity without the erasure of differences. Key Words: community • difference • ethnicity • familial view • gender • identity • race • sexuality • solidarity • Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This book explores the epistemic side of racial and sexual oppression. It elucidates how social insensitivities and imposed silences prevent members of different groups from listening to each other.

Three main issues are of cardinal interest in this paper. The first issue relates to the canons of discourse—the parameters that inform and guide any discussion—in African philosophy. These canons are accepted in one form or the other by the philosophers who have actually formulated some of them and those who have devoted their academical careers to the promotion of the positive study of African philosophy. Consequently this paper should be viewed in the same light as C.E.M. Joad's A Critique (...) of Logical Positivism in which the “Great Tradition” in philosophy is classically expounded and defended against the onslaught of the philosophical exuberance and extraordinary claims of the logical positivists in the sense that it is a rejoinder to the attack on African philosophy by those who actually may want to be known as African logical neo-positivists. (shrink)

This book explores how traditional relations among the arts have changed in our time, focusing on the radical transformation of Paul Cezanne.

v. 1. Religions and their doctrines. -- v. 2. Religion and morality. -- v. 3. Religion and nation building. -- v. 4. Philosophy of religious tolerance.

Through a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following discussions, this article defends a negotiating model of normativity according to which normative authority is always subject to contestation. To refute both individualism and collectivism, I supplement Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument with a Social Language Argument, showing that normativity cannot be monopolized either individually or socially (i.e. it cannot be privatized or collectivized). The negotiating view of normativity here developed lays the foundations of a politics of radical contestation which converges with Chantal Mouffe's (...) framework of 'radical democracy', while departing from her agonism in preserving the structuring and constraining role that tacit agreement in action plays in rule-following practices. My account of the 'burdens of eccentricity' elucidates how the normative force of dissidence can be properly recognized and used effectively for social transformations. I argue that there is a 'presumption of normalcy' in favour of the established consensus of action, but that this presumption is defeasible: in normative disagreements, a violation of expected normalcy shifts the burden onto the shoulders of rebellious agents who must show that their dissenting behaviour can be a legitimate extension, revision, or transformation of the practice in question. (shrink)

This paper defends a contextualist approach to epistemic injustice according to which instances of such injustice should be looked at as temporally extended phenomena (having developmental and historical trajectories) and socially extended phenomena (being rooted in patterns of social relations). Within this contextualist framework, credibility excesses appear as a form of undeserved epistemic privilege that is crucially relevant for matters of testimonial justice. While drawing on Miranda Fricker's proportional view of epistemic justice, I take issue with its lack of attention (...) to the role that credibility excesses play in testimonial injustices. I depart from Fricker's view of the relation between credibility excesses and credibility deficits, and I offer an alternative account of the contributions that undeserved epistemic privileges make to epistemic injustices. Then, through the detailed analysis of To kill a mockingbird, I elucidate the crucial role played by the social imaginary in creating and sustaining epistemic injustices, developing an analysis of the kind of social blindness produced by an oppressive social imaginary that establishes unjust patterns of credibility excesses and deficits. (shrink)

While in agreement with Miranda Fricker’s context-sensitive approach to hermeneutical injustice, this paper argues that this contextualist approach has to be pluralized and rendered relational in more complex ways. In the first place, I argue that the normative assessment of social silences and the epistemic harms they generate cannot be properly carried out without a pluralistic analysis of the different interpretative communities and expressive practices that coexist in the social context in question. Social silences and hermeneutical gaps are misrepresented if (...) they are uniformly predicated of an entire social context, instead of being predicated of particular ways of inhabiting that context by particular people in relation to particular others. I contend that a more nuanced—polyphonic—contextualization offers a more adequate picture of what it means to break social silences and to repair the hermeneutical injustices associated with them. In the second place, I argue that the particular obligations with respect to hermeneutical justice that differently situated subjects and groups have are interactive and need to be determined relationally. That is, whether individuals and groups live up to their hermeneutical responsibilities has to be assessed by taking into account the forms of mutual positionality, relationality, and responsivity (or lack thereof) that these subjects and groups display with respect to one another. The central argument is developed through an examination of what in race theory and in contemporary epistemologies of ignorance has been termed “white ignorance”; that is, the kind of hermeneutical inability of privileged white subjects to recognize and make sense of their racial identities, experiences, and social positionality. (shrink)

En este escrito quiero mostrar que la relación entre la memoria y el deber moral de recordar implica la intermediación necesaria del interés y el análisis de las consecuencias que de allí se siguen, para una concepción más incluyente y pragmática de las relaciones entre ética y moral. Comienzo señalando, mediante ejemplos, que sí hay exigencias morales relacionadas con el deber de recordar. Luego, entro a considerar la naturaleza de estas exigencias morales y su vinculación con lo que entendemos como (...) interés, para finalmente establecer una caracterización fluida y no excluyente de las interacciones entre ética y moralidad. El punto de partida de estas reflexiones son las lecciones sobre La ética del recuerdo (2002) de Avishai Margalit. El problema que Margalit se plantea es el siguiente: ¿Existe una ética de la memoria? ¿Bajo que circunstancias podemos afirmar que estamos obligados a recordar personas y acontecimientos del pasado? ¿De qué tipo de obligación estamos hablando aquí? ¿Quiénes están sujetos a la obligación: los individuos o los colectivos sociales? (shrink)

This work approaches the distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that in terms of two complementary concepts: performance and information. In order to do so, I formulate Ryle’s argument of infinite regress in terms of performance in order to show that Stanley and Williamson’s counterargument has no real object: both reject the view that the exercise of knowledge-that necessarily requires the previous consideration of propositions. Next, using the concept of feedback, I argue that Stanley and Williamson’s positive account of knowledge-how in terms (...) of knowledge-that corresponds to the output of the comparison between an intention of action and the perceived outcome of performance. Then, I expound other theories of mind and cognition in which feedback and prediction play a fundamental role in order to explain other ways in which information intervenes in performance—i.e., information is construed as knowledge-that available at subject level that guides performance. Finally, I present some reflections on the impact of the concept of knowledge-how, and possible routes to continue our enquiry on the nature of knowledge. (shrink)

This article demonstrates the possibilities and problems of the formation of a new type of human‐technique‐nature relationship ‐ the organic technique ‐ in modern civilization. It is a relationship in which neither human nor nature must adapt to the needs of technology; rather, the technique is embedded in nature and becomes 'human-sized'. We can find a model for building this new type of relationship in the construction of buildings from bamboo. The uniqueness of bamboo as a building material manifests in (...) two ways. The first relates to resources: bamboo is a very fast-growing plant, so cutting it's stem does not destroy the plant itself and in three to four years there is a new 'harvest'. This means bamboo has an extremely low cost, which is critical for developing countries with rapidly growing populations. Second, bamboo has a number of architectural advantages. Due to the flexibility and elasticity of this product, bamboo buildings are earthquake resistant. Such structures do not violate the natural landscape, but instead work with it; they are characterized by low cost and ease of construction, in a variety of forms. This has led to the widespread use of bamboo by leading architects and innovators from different countries. This article shows that the application of bamboo in architecture ‐ as opposed to artificial materials such as concrete, which exploit and destroy nature and impose their forms on cultures ‐ helps this building technique to integrate into the life of ecosystems and society, and thus to become a model of harmonizing human‐technique‐nature relations. (shrink)

[Medina In the margin of a congress on the presence of Ortega’s legacy].

In this essay I argue that epistemic injustices can be understood and explained as social pathologies of recognition, and that this way of conceptualizing epistemic injustices can help us develop proper diagnostic and corrective treatments for them. I distinguish between two different kinds of recognition deficiency—quantitative recognition deficits and misrecognitions—and I ague that while the rectification of the former simply requires more recognition, the rectification of the latter calls for a shift in the mode of recognition, that is, a deep (...) transformation of the recognition dynamics so that other forms of recognition can emerge. Arguing against incremental recognitional approaches that aim only at increasing social visibility/audibility, I examine communicative dysfunctions around the phenomenon of racist violence in order to show how problems of misrecognition persist and become recalcitrant even when quantitative recognition deficits disappear. (shrink)

Drawing on contemporary epistemologies of ignorance, I analyze the American ideology of color blindness as a recalcitrant form of active ignorance that operates at a meta-level. I contend that the meta-ignorance involved in color blindness operates through distorting second-order attitudes about one's cognitive and affective attitudes, resulting in cognitive and affective numbness with respect to racial matters: ignorance of one's racial ignorance and insensitivity to one's racial insensitivity. I contend that the black/white binary that has dominated the American racial imagination (...) has contributed tremendously to establish and maintain meta-blindness about racial differences. I suggest that overcoming the black/white binary demands that we expand current conceptions of racial lucidity and that we go beyond the notions of double consciousness that critical race theorists have defended since Du Bois and Fanon. According to a more expansive social pluralism, lucidity with respect to racial differences requires a kaleidoscopic consciousness that does not reinscribe the black/white binary in one's racial imagination. (shrink)

El pensamiento de Ortega y Gasset amplía la crítica vitalista de la segunda mitad del siglo XIX que superó el mito de los <>, criticándolo como encubridor de una farsa y creador del fraude humanístico de una tensión aporética entre vida y cultura. Los valores de la vida constituyen una afirmación ante el racionalismo extraviado en sus propios conceptos. La razón vital orteguiana es la comprensión lúcida del sencido antes que la explicación gris de estructuras. La metafísica (...) de la vida que presenta Ortega exige ir más allá de la visión antropológica centrada en la pregunta <>, lo cual lleva a un compromiso con la vivencia de la identidad generada por la biograf1a personal y los contenidos determinantes de la historia. La pregunta por la <> es una reflexión metafísica que supera los condicionantes del concepto << naturaleza humana>>.Ortega y Gasset broadens the vitalist's criticism of the second half of the 19th Century against << the ideals of civilization>> as a myth that cloaks the humanistic fraud of a tension between life and culture. Instead, the values of life stand before a rationalism puzzled by its own conceptions. Ortega´s << vital reason>> is the lucid understanding of meaning as compared with the dull explanation of structures. Ortega's metaphysics of life overcomes the anthropological view focused on the question <>and replaces it by the pivot question <>, which sets out a compromise with self-identity as originated in own personal life story within the frame of general history. The question for 'human condition' is a metaphysical reflection, which lies beyond the limitations of the concept of 'human nature'.  . (shrink)

L'analyse des rapports entre les concepts de temps et de mouvement dans la philosophie première de Hobbes permet de confirmer la dimension dynamique de son matérialisme qui ne prend sens qu'avec la théorie unifiée du conatus. Elle nous conduit aussi à reconsidérer le nominalisme radical qu'on lui attribue généralement, à partir d'une interrogation sur le statut de ce que Hobbes appelle la puissance imaginative. The analysis of the relations between the concepts of time and movement in Hobbes' first philosophy allows (...) that dynamic dimension of his materialism which only takes on meaning with the unified theory of the conatus, to be confirmed. It also leads us to reconsider the radical nominalism that is generally attributed to him, by means of an interrogation of the status of what Hobbes calls imaginative power. (shrink)

Drawing on American and Latin American philosophers such as John Dewey, Alain Locke, and José Martí, this chapter articulates a thoroughgoing pluralistic view of ethnic identity in general and of Hispanic identity in particular. The chapter argues that the best way of elucidating ethnic experiences and identities without relying on essentialist assumptions is offered by a radical pluralism that we can find in the pragmatist tradition. This radical pluralism understands ethnic identity as intrinsically heterogeneous, that is, as necessarily containing inner (...) diversity. (shrink)

In this essay I examine the contributions of the pragmatist tradition to the philosophy of ethnicity. From the pragmatist philosophies of Dewey and Locke I derive a reconstructive model for the clarification and improvement of the life experiences of ethnic groups. Addressing various problems and objections, I argue that this Deweyan and Lockean reconstructive model rejects any sharp separation between race and ethnicity and avoids the pitfalls of the biologist race paradigm and the culturalist ethnicity paradigm. I explore some of (...) the social and political implications of this reconstructive model through a discussion of José Martí's inspiring account of Hispanic identity. (shrink)

This research aims to fill a major gap in the relevant literature on small businesses in developing countries, specifically concerning the development of models to better explain economic and environmental performance as a result of environmental compliance, thus moving toward an explanation of the sustainable behavior of these businesses. Data from 186 pottery craft businesses located in three Mexican states (Oaxaca, Puebla and Tlaxcala) reveal that environmental compliance significantly influences economic and environmental performance, with the mediating role of environmental innovation, (...) confirming the Porter hypothesis in the context of small businesses in an emerging economy. Environmental compliance is an important factor in improving the economic and environmental performance of small businesses in emerging economies. (shrink)

While in the movies or reading a novel, how can we feel terrified by monsters, ghosts, and fictional serial killers? And how can we feel sad or outraged by depictions of cruelty? After all, we know that the imagined threats that we fear do not exist and, therefore, pose no real threat to us; and we know that the instances of cruelty that bring tears to our eyes have not happened. And yet, the fear, the sadness, or the outrage experienced (...) in our imaginations feels very real. This is the so-called paradox of "fictional emotions." This and related paradoxes have become recalcitrant problems for a purely representational approach to the imagination that tries to accommodate the imagination in a belief-desire psychology, explaining our imaginings as mental states that are similar to beliefs or desires in some ways but not others—as "quasi-beliefs" or "quasi-desires." This representational approach can be seen, for example, in Kendall Walton's influential account of the imagination as "make-believe," or in Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich's boxological account of the imagination as a "pretend box," which is in close interaction with the suspiciously similar "belief box". (shrink)

Expanding Miranda Fricker's (2007) concept of epistemic injustice, recent accounts of agential epistemic injustice (Lackey, 2020; Medina, 2021; Pohlhaus, 2020) have focused on cases in which the epistemic agency of individuals or groups is unfairly blocked, constrained, or subverted. In this article I argue that agential epistemic injustice is perpetrated against marginalized groups not only when their group epistemic agency is excluded, but also when it is included but receives defective uptake that neutralizes their capacity to resist epistemic oppression. (...) I identify two harms that such injustice inflicts on marginalized groups: epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of resistant epistemic group agency. My analysis shows how the harms of agential epistemic injustice can occur through unfair epistemic exclusions in group dynamics, but also through forms of inclusion in group dynamics that distort or coopt the epistemic agency of the group. Following Emmalon Davis (2018) and her analysis of epistemic appropriation, I argue that the harms of agential epistemic injustice can occur when the resistant epistemic resources of a marginalized group are appropriated in a way that disempowers them and critically defangs their resistant epistemic agency. I use Taylor Rogers’ (2021) analysis of the epistemic appropriation of “#MeToo” and “intersectionality” to show how epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging work in unjust epistemic group dynamics. The article offers a diagnosis of the failures of epistemic responsibility involved in agential epistemic injustice, and some suggestions for resisting those failures and working toward more responsible and just epistemic group dynamics. (shrink)

Explores the stable core of Wittgenstein's philosophy as developed from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations.